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Abstract
Commons dilemmas are interaction situations where a common good is provided or exploited by a group of individuals so
that optimal collective outcomes clash with private interests. Although in these situations, social norms and institutions
exist that might help individuals to cooperate, little is known about the interaction effects between positive and negative
incentives and exit options by individuals. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of
exit, rewards and punishment, as well as the interplay between exit and rewards and punishment. We found that
punishment had a stronger effect than rewards on cooperation if considered by itself, whereas rewards had a stronger
effect when combined with voluntary participation. This can be explained in terms of the ‘framing effect’, i.e., as the
combination of exit and rewards might induce people to attach higher expected payoffs to cooperative strategies and
expect better behaviour from others.
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Introduction
In all cases of public good provision, such as good quality
scientific peer review or a clean public beach in a popular place,
many individuals are called to pool their private resources for the
benefit of the whole group, including those who do not
contribute[1–3]. In cases of common-pool resource (CPR), such
as natural resource exploitation or artificial infrastructure use,
individuals benefit by sharing a good where there are significant
consumption externalities. In these cases, the problem is not
whether to contribute to the common pool but how to reduce the
exploitation level from it [4,5]. Although any collective outcome
can be maximised when everyone cooperates, self-interest
motivation can induce individuals to free-ride, either by contrib-
uting nothing or by extracting more than their sustainable share,
predicting that others will do the same.
The archetypal model of these social dilemmas is the public
good game (from now on, PG), where participants are endowed
with a fixed sum of money and choose whether to keep it in their
own private account ( = defection) or to contribute to the public
good ( = cooperation) [6,7]. The amount kept by participants
increases their payoff, but contributions are multiplied by a factor
m[(1=n,n) and then divided evenly between everyone, indepen-
dent of their contribution. Since mvn, it is not individually
beneficial to contribute to the public good, irrespective of what
other individuals do. Therefore, the game has a dominant strategy,
keeping one’s entire endowment. However, since mw1=n, in the
case where all participants contribute, everyone would be better
off, with a social optimum given by all participants contributing
their whole amount.
The experimental results from PG and CPR games consistently
rejected the theoretical prediction of universal defection, with
cooperation usually starting at intermediate levels. When the game
was repeated under anonymity and with no communication,
cooperation progressively declined over time, approaching zero
after a few rounds [4,7]. To solve this problem, research looked at
a variety of factors which counterbalanced defection, including the
marginal cooperation gain (i.e., m), group size and stability, as well
as various communication and reputation systems [8,9].
Furthermore, institutions and organizations provide material
and non-material incentives to help people to cooperate [10–12].
Various institutional arrangements, such as bonus programmes
and ethical codes in organizations, can be seen as targeting
interactions which include a coherent set of positive and negative
incentives (i.e., rewards and punishments) that can make
cooperation more predictable [13,14]. Similarly, commons man-
agement institutions regulate resource exploitation by imposing
limits to individual consumption and by punishing overuse [2,11].
In this respect, certain studies have investigated the effect of
both positive and negative institutional incentives [15–22]. In this
case, any incentive greater than the cost of cooperation, whether
positive or negative, should ideally change the dominant defection
strategy at an individual level. For instance, imagine a situation
where two players simultaneously choose whether to pay a cost
cw0 to give a benefit bwc to the opponent. In this case, the
structure of the game is similar to a PD with its dominant defection
strategy. Nevertheless, both negative and positive incentives, if
greater than c, can change a players’ behaviour and lead to full
cooperation. Therefore, the mere threat of imposing a fine is
sufficient to avoid free-riding, while positive incentives have
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actually to be paid when cooperation is established, so presenting a
direct cost for the organization or institution involved. This has led
some authors to argue that negative incentives are more effective
than positive ones. This is why both democratic and non-
democratic governments largely rely on ‘sticks’ rather than
‘carrots’ to foster rule compliance [23].
Previous research of PG games has shown that individuals are
willing to punish defectors even in one shot games or when the
possibility of repeated encounters between the same players was
ruled out [8,15–18,22]. Punishment usually takes the form of a fine
that subjects can impose on other group members at a cost to
themselves. For instance, after receiving information about other
players’ behaviour, each participant can decide whether to use
part of their endowment to punish other group members or not. In
most cases, the rule is that for each monetary unit (MU) used in
punishing, the target is fined by three MU [8,15–17]. However, at
least in the short run, the cost of fines overcomes any cooperation
gains [15,17,20]. Although some experiments indicated that a net
benefit may be obtained when the interaction is repeated enough
[24], punishment decreases participants’ earnings, leaving the
question of whether this institutional scheme is actually profitable
or robust unsolved. Moreover, recent CPR experiments showed
that punishment does not positively affect participant’s earnings
unless combined with communication [25].
An alternative to imposing negative incentives on defectors is to
give positive ones to cooperators. In this case, participants can use
part of their endowment to increase the earnings of other
participants, often with the usual three to one ratio. Experiments
have shown that participants who cooperate in PG games are
inclined to reward other cooperators [19,20,22,26]. Moreover,
when possible, participants tend to prefer positive over negative
incentives [27]. Although the debate regarding the effectiveness of
positive vs. negative incentive is still open, these results indicate
that individuals usually prefer not to incur negative sanctions for
their behaviour [19,20,23,27].
Furthermore, a few papers have investigated the effect of
centralized institutions that might induce participants to cooper-
ate. Attention has so far been concentrated more on understand-
ing the opportunity of implementing these institutional solutions.
Kosfeld and colleagues designed a public-good experiment where
participants could implement an external cooperation-enforcing
‘organization’ by paying a fixed cost [28]. They found that, even if
many groups succeeded in implementing this organization and
consequently achieved higher payoffs, this outcome was not robust
and depended both on structural factors (e.g., the return rate from
the public good and the number of group members) and on the
perceived ‘fairness’ of the organization. Similarly, in another CPR
experiment, Walker and colleagues found that introducing the
possibility of voting for a mandatory ‘allocation rule’ substantially
increased outcome efficiency. Surprisingly, they found that
requiring unanimity as a condition to select the enforcing
institution was more efficient than simply relying on a majority
voting rule [21].
Early theoretical works on iterated PD games considered that
voluntary participation could led to increased cooperation [29].
Indeed, by introducing an exit option, the predominance of a
single strategy was less likely than a rock-paper-scissors succession
of cooperators, defectors, and ‘loners’ (agents choosing not to
participate in the game) [30–33]. In this vein, [34] recently looked
at the interplay between incentives provided by an institution and
the effect of voluntary participation in public goods games through
an applied evolutionary game theory model. Exploring this
interplay is key to understanding many empirical situations where
there is substantial demand of both positive and negative
incentives [35]. Their results indicated that cooperation is less
probable when good behaviour is rewarded than where institu-
tional arrangements punish bad behaviour. The combined effect
of voluntary participation and positive incentives was weaker,
leading to high cooperation levels only when the incentives were
considerably higher. By experimentally investigating the interplay
and the economic efficiency of positive and negative incentives in
public good games, [20] concluded that certain synergies between
the two measures could take place, although negative ones are
more effective in promoting cooperation and are easier to build in
organizations, unfortunately to the detriment of efficiency [23,26].
This contrasts with the experimental results of [13], where it was
found that negative incentives could even reduce cooperation.
This was because it induced individuals to frame the game as a
self-interest competition situation with defection as the expected
dominant strategy, especially in the case of weak and little credible
sanctions [36]. By introducing the possibility that players’ identities
would be known in repeated public good games, [19] showed that
the potential positive incentives could be significantly increased.
Furthermore, while voluntary participation is often considered
positive in organizational literature [13,14,37], studies on CPR
management usually consider any exit option as a factor reducing
interdependence within the users’ group and dependence on the
resource [38]. This means that an exit can have a negative effect
on cooperation in a commons game. Moreover, little is known on
the interplay between exit options and incentives [34]. On the one
hand, institutional incentives and exit options could be considered
as single alternatives, or at best synergistic measures to motivate
people and improve individual effort and commitment to
cooperation [37]. Indeed, voluntary participation may switch
individual attention towards freedom and willingness and so
promote self-motivated good behaviour [13,14,39]. On the other
hand, exits could favour free-riding by allowing individuals to
escape negative incentives and by reducing the commitment of
individuals towards the group’s interests [40].
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the complex interplay
of voluntary participation and incentives, both positive and
negative. We experimentally investigated: (i) whether voluntary
participation could favour cooperation in commons dilemma
situations where incentives are insufficient to establish coopera-
tion, i.e., they do not change the dominant strategy of defection for
players, and (ii) what is the effect of the interplay between
incentives and the exit option.
Experimental Design
A total of 144 subjects (58% females) participated in the
experiment. They played in sessions of 24 subjects and interacted
anonymously through a computer network. Each experimental
session took approximate 40 minutes, including instruction
reading. The average payoff, including the show-up fee, was
10.52 Euro and all earnings were paid in cash at the end of the
experiment.
All participants played 10 periods of an introductory ‘modified
public good game’, presented below, plus 10 further treatment
periods differing in each session. The goal of the introductory
periods was to let the participants familiarize themselves with the
game and create a situation where defection dominated, while
treatments allowed us to test the effect of the incentive schemes
and exit.
The game was played in groups of six, who changed after each
period. At the beginning of the game, participants received an
endowment of 100 Monetary Units (MU), with an exchange rate
of 1 MU = 2 Euro cents. In each period, they were asked to decide
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whether to bear a cost of 10 MU to provide a benefit of 20 MU to
the other group members, evenly divided among them. This
meant that the individual payoff in case of full cooperation was
10 MU, while that for full defection was 0 MU. However, a
unilateral defector could earn 20 MU while a cooperator in an
otherwise defecting group could lose 10 MU. At the end of each
period, the resulting payoffs were added/subtracted to/from the
endowment and the outcome was communicated to all players.
In designing the game, we followed [34] in assuming that the
contribution of each subject provided benefits only to other group
members. This meant that contributing in our game was a purely
altruistic action, with nothing returned to the cooperative player.
This made the decisions unequivocally cooperative and better
approximating real-world situations where the direct benefit of
cooperation is negligible due to the large number of individuals
playing the dilemma.
At the end of the introductory periods, all subjects received a
new endowment of 100 MU and played 10 further periods where
one of the variables below was manipulated following a 2|3
factorial design. The first factor, called Exit, was an exit option
allowing subjects to decide in each period whether to participate or
not in the game, while in the No Exit treatments, all subjects played
the game as before. Consistent with previous experiments that
introduced the same variable, neither exiting or participating in
the game had any cost [30,32]. Subjects who chose to participate
played as before, while those who opted out bore no cost but could
not derive any benefits from cooperation. Note that, since opting
out reduced the number of active group members, each of the
remaining players earned a higher share of the 20 MU from
cooperative choices. On the other hand, in order to rule out any
strategic behaviour from knowing the number of other subjects
who participated in the game, each decision to participate and
cooperate was taken simultaneously by everyone. To sum up,
subjects in the exit treatments faced a three-option choice between
(i) providing the benefit, (ii) not providing the benefit, and (iii) not
participating in the game. Subjects were also told that, in case of
only one subject choosing to participate, the current period game
would not be carried out.
The second factor, called Incentive, was based on three incentive
levels: null, positive, and negative. Under the positive scheme, we
assumed that a reward of 5 MU was awarded to cooperators.
Under the negative scheme, a fine of 5 MU was dispensed to free-
riders. Under the null scheme, all subjects played the game as
before. Note that the level of the incentive was intentionally set to
ensure that a player’s dominant strategy was still to defect. Here,
we assumed all incentives were established by an external
controller and that perfect enforcement existed. Table 1 summa-
rizes the six treatments depending on the intersection of all factor
levels.
It is worth noting that while experimental research has mostly
examined decentralized punishment [15,16,18], in many real-
world situations an institution may exist, at least partially separated
from individuals or organizations ‘that play the game’, that
administers sanctions to players. In cases of private business, public
administration and common-pool resources, the puzzle is not who
should enforce the rule but whether the enforcement level is
effective in providing sufficient incentives to overcome the free-
riding temptation of individuals.
Hypotheses
We formulated six hypotheses about the expected outcome of
the different treatments of our experiment (plus the introductory
periods).
Hypothesis 1. In the Introductory Periods, Cooperation
is Expected to Start at Intermediate Levels and then
Decline. In standard public good games, cooperation usually
starts at intermediate levels and then declines. This has been
explained in terms of learning or as a reciprocity effect and has
been found in many variants of this experiment and similar ones
[6,7,41–43]. There was no reason to expect that our game would
be different. Since the cost of cooperation was consistent, i.e., none
contribution was returned to the contributor, we expected that the
decline could be even more pronounced in our experiment than in
standard PG games.
Hypothesis 2. The No-Null Treatment Should Lead to
Cooperation Levels Similar to or Lower than the
Introductory Periods. We Expect that its Dynamics Will
Follow a Downward Trend. Restarting a public good game
usually leads to an increase in cooperation (even if not necessarily
up to the initial level) followed by a new decline [44]. In No-Null,
we expected that cooperation should decline over time, as in the
introductory periods. Given that participants had already experi-
enced the game during the introductory periods, we expected that
the decline in cooperation could be even more pronounced.
Hypothesis 3. Cooperation in the Ex-Null Treatment is
Expected to be Higher than that Observed in No-
Null. Theoretical work [29,31,33] and previous experiments
have shown that voluntary participation tends to increase
cooperation because of the effect of cognitive mechanism such
as the ‘projection’ to others of the initial player’s own behavioural
intentions [30,32]. Accordingly, we expected Ex-Null to produce a
higher proportion of cooperative moves than No-Null, where
participation was mandatory. This is justified mainly in light of
[30], who showed that, when participation is voluntary, intending
cooperators are more willing to enter the game than intending
defectors. This is because we also expected a higher number of exit
choices by intending defectors.
Hypothesis 4. Positive and Negative Incentives with no
Exit (No-Pos and No-Neg treatments) should Increase
Cooperation but not Sufficiently to Stop its Downward
Trend. Although insufficient in changing the dominant strategy
of rational players, we expected that both negative and positive
incentives should increase cooperation compared with No-Null.
This is because individuals tend to react to sanctions even when
these are only symbolic [45] or not credible [46]. However,
following previous experimental results, we expected that the
presence of a significant share of free-riders should progressively
reduce cooperation as, for reciprocity reasons, potential cooper-
ators would also be induced to contribute little, with little
difference between the No-Pos and No-Neg cases [16,20,43,47].
Hypothesis 5. When Exit is Combined with Negative
Incentives (Ex-Neg treatment), Cooperation should Increase
more than in the No-Null and No-Neg Treatments. Under a
negative incentive scheme, free-riders have a rational interest in
leaving the game as long as the fees are higher than the expected
benefit from the cooperation of other individuals, i.e., bn=(m{1)
MU, where b is the benefit given to others group members, m is




Exit No No-Null No-Neg No-Pos
Yes Ex-Null Ex-Neg Ex-Pos
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.t001
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the number of subjects participating in the game, and n is the
number of cooperative subjects. Given the parameters of this
game, such an outcome was expected if there were at least two
cooperators in the group. The exit of free-riders is expected to
allow cooperation to spread at least up to the point where free-
riders have a reason to re-enter the game. Moreover, [34] argued
that this scheme can lead to full cooperation even with low
incentives. We expected to find from intermediate to high levels of
cooperation and a significant use of the exit option, mainly by
intending defectors.
Hypothesis 6. When Exit is Combined with Positive
Incentives (Ex-Pos Treatment), Cooperation should
Increase, but not More than in No-Pos. Under a positive
incentive scheme, free-riders have no interest in leaving the game
and so the exit option is non-influential. Moreover, Sasaki et al.
predicted that this combination should be less effective than the
voluntary participation plus negative incentives [34]. Therefore,
we expected cooperation levels and game dynamics similar to the
No-Pos treatment.
Results
In line with previous PG game results and consistent with our
first hypothesis, cooperation in the introductory periods started at
intermediate levels (cooperation proportion in period 1:
0:57+0:04) and then declined, leading to a situation where
defection was the most common strategy (cooperation proportion
in period 10: 0:16+0:03). In subsequent periods, cooperation
varied depending on the treatment (Fig. 1). Table 2 shows the
descriptive statistics for all treatments. All statistical analyses were
performed using the R platform, version 2.15.1 [48]. The dataset is
provided as supporting information.
None of the treatments were capable of fully stopping the
decline in cooperation typical of PG and social dilemma games.
Paired tests on individual averages in periods 1–5 and 6–10 led to
the following results: No-Null, V~123, p~0:010; No-Pos, V~225,
pv0:001; No-Neg, V~152, p~0:002; Ex-Null, V~66:5,
p~0:016; Ex-Pos, V~131, p~0:025; Ex-Neg, V~144:5,
pv0:001 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p values are one tailed).
Nevertheless, our six experimental conditions led to significantly
different outcomes (Fig. 2). Consistent with our second hypothesis,
defection prevailed in No-Null, which was a repetition of the
introductory periods and was our control condition. The average
proportion of cooperative moves was 0:15+0:02 with a declining
trend approaching zero cooperation in the final periods.
The introduction of voluntary participation alone did not
increase cooperation compared with the previous treatments.
Unlike our third hypothesis, Ex-Null led to only a minimal increase
of cooperation. The average proportion of cooperative moves was
0:21+0:03, which was not significantly different from No-Null
(Wilcoxon rank sum test on individual averages: W~244:5,
p~0:180 one-tailed). It is also worth noting that participants
rarely opted to exit, i.e., only slightly more than 1% of the time.
The outcome changed when institutional incentives were
introduced. Although the rewards were theoretically insufficient
to alter the players’ dominant strategy, No-Pos led to significantly
higher cooperation (0:32+0:03) than No-Null (W~148, p~0:002
one-tailed), even if defection still dominated, especially in the final
periods. On the other hand, No-Neg led to a majority of
cooperative moves (0:55+0:03). The difference from No-Null
was highly significant (W~86:5, pv0:001 one-tailed) and the
treatment led to significantly higher cooperation than No-Pos
(W~157:5, p~0:004 one-tailed). Therefore, in the case of
mandatory participation, the influence of negative incentives on
cooperation was stronger. This is consistent with our fourth
hypothesis, even if the superiority of negative over positive
incentives was not expected.
The introduction of voluntary participation combined with the
incentive schemes generally led to more cooperation. Consistent
with our fifth hypothesis, Ex-Neg led to higher cooperation than
No-Null (0:45+0:03, W~68:5, pv0:001 one-tailed). However,
cooperation levels were slightly lower than in No-Neg, although the
difference was statistically significant only at the 10% level
(W~344:5, p~0:073 one-tailed). As expected, this was the
treatment where most participants chose to exit (15%), with less
cooperative participants choosing to exit more frequently, as
Figure 1. Average cooperation proportion per treatment and period. The introductory period data for all groups were pooled in a single
curve.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.g001
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predicted. The correlation between the individual proportion of
cooperative moves in the ten introductory periods of the game and
the number of exits in the treatment periods was negative
(r~{0:41). This meant that negative incentives induced intend-
ing defectors to seriously consider opting out to avoid fees.
Ex-Pos led to a proportion of cooperative moves close to,
although somewhat higher than, Ex-Neg (0:49+0:03). In this case,
the subjects rarely chose to exit (i.e., less than 2% of the time). The
difference with No-Null was highly significant (W~46, pv0:001).
It is worth noting that Ex-Pos led to more cooperation than No-Pos
(W~161:5, p~0:004 one-tailed). Moreover, unlike the case
where participation was mandatory, in this case, the level of
cooperation approached the case of negative incentives, i.e., Ex-
Neg. It is worth noting that, while the fact that Ex-Pos led to more
cooperation than No-Null was consistent with the first part of the
sixth hypothesis, the fact that the treatment led to cooperation
levels similar to Ex-Neg and above No-Pos contradicted the second
statement of the same hypothesis.
We examined the interplay between the incentives and exits in
greater detail by performing an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
the proportion of cooperative moves for each subject in all
treatment periods (Table 3). This showed that our factors were
overall significant predictors of cooperative behaviour
(F5,137~12:02, pv0:001). More specifically, the model showed
that exit was not significant in itself (so our third hypothesis did not
hold) but highlighted a significant interaction effect between exit
and positive incentives (F1,137~5:865, p~0:017) and a weakly
significant between exit and negative incentives (F1,137~3:458,
p~0:065). The former effect is consistent with the sixth hypothesis
predicting an increase of cooperation when voluntary participation
is combined with positive incentives, while the latter supports (at
least weakly) the fifth hypothesis on the joint effect of voluntary
participation and negative incentives. Moreover, the pure effect of
negative incentives was highly significant also considering all
interaction effects (F1,137~47:287, pv0:001), which was a further
confirmation of the fourth hypothesis.
As regards participants’ earnings, Ex-Pos led to the highest
absolute final profit, followed by No-Pos and No-Neg (Fig. 3a). In
order to control for the fact that extra money was at stake in No-Pos
and Ex-Pos, we also measured profit as a proportion of the
theoretical optimum, i.e., as the amount earned in case of full
cooperation plus the sum of all positive incentives (Fig. 3b). In Ex-
Pos, participants achieved a profit equal to 69% of the optimum,
which is the best result of all treatments. This meant that the
combination of voluntary participation and positive incentives not
only ensured high cooperation but was also economically efficient.
In this respect, the second best treatment was No-Neg (67%),
followed by Ex-Null (60%), No-Pos (59%), and both No-Null and Ex-
Neg (both 58%).
Additional confirmation of the positive interaction effect
between exit and incentives on earnings was in the analysis of
variance presented in Table 4. As before, the model significantly
predicted differences in earning (F5,138~33:92, pv0:001). More
specifically, this analysis showed that, besides the expected
Table 2. Overview of experimental results.
Female Participant age Helping proportion Exit proportion Final profit
Treatment proportion mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
No-Null 0.46 23.17 2.90 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 115.00 17.11
No-Neg 0.71 23.79 2.62 0.55 0.50 0.00 0.00 133.12 20.32
No-Pos 0.58 23.50 3.58 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 147.50 15.99
Ex-Null 0.54 22.08 1.77 0.21 0.41 0.01 0.11 120.83 20.60
Ex-Neg 0.63 22.08 2.32 0.45 0.50 0.15 0.36 115.00 20.56
Ex-Pos 0.58 23.21 2.70 0.49 0.50 0.02 0.13 171.88 18.02
All 0.58 22.97 2.74 0.36 0.48 0.06 0.24 133.89 27.66
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.t002
Figure 2. Treatment effects on cooperation. Average cooperation
proportion per treatment with standard error bars.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.g002
Table 3. ANOVA table on cooperation (individual averages).
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(wF)
exit 1 0.051 0.051 1.005 0.318
positive 1 0.127 0.127 2.470 0.118
negative 1 2.422 2.422 47.287 0.000
exit6positive 1 0.300 0.300 5.865 0.017
exit6negative 1 0.177 0.177 3.458 0.065
residuals 137 7.018 0.051
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.t003
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significant pure effect of positive incentives (F1,138~134:75,
pv0:001), it is worth noting that there were also significant
interaction effects between exit and positive incentives
(F1,138~20:96, pv0:001) and between exit and negative incen-
tives (F1,138~9:68, p~0:002), the latter leading to lower average
earnings.
Discussion
It is generally acknowledged that individuals are sensitive to the
magnitude of incentives and that, when incentives are consider-
able, cooperation tends to proliferate [49]. However, institutions
do not always succeed in providing sufficient incentives to avoid
free-riding temptations. This fact motivated us to examine a
situation where a sanctioning system existed but was not
sufficiently strong to change the dominant strategy of the players.
Following recent theoretical investigations, we added voluntary
participation in the the game as a second factor potentially capable
of increasing cooperation levels [29,31,33], notably in interaction
with institutional actions [34].
Our experiment confirmed the strength of negative incentives in
motivating cooperation, while positive ones led only to small
improvements if considered individually. We found that although
sanctions were theoretically insufficient to alter the subjects’
rational preferences, No-Neg produced a prevalence of cooperation.
This contrasted with the idea of a detrimental effect of sanctions
on human altruism [50] and more generally, with the idea that
monetary incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations [51,52].
Indeed, we found that even the imposition of small fines led to a
significant increase in cooperation. A possible explanation is that
fines might have triggered positive behaviour by highlighting
misbehaviour. Although our experimental instructions were
abstract and simplified (e.g., by using ‘incentives’ and ‘disincen-
tives’ instead of ‘rewards’ and ‘fines’; see Materials and Methods),
it is possible that by penalizing noncooperative action, subjects
framed the game as a moral decision and were induced to
cooperate more than rationally expected, even if this led to lower
earnings.
In contrast with our third hypothesis and with certain previous
studies [30,32], voluntary participation did not increase cooper-
ation if individually considered. This was due to the fact that,
participation being a voluntary decision, intending defectors were
not motivated to opt out and, therefore, there was no room for a
cooperative equilibrium. Even if this happens in many real-world
situations, an interesting extension of our study could be to
introduce a participation cost or conversely, a fixed reward for
non-participation. More generally, our experimental design could
be extended to test more complex forms of incentives.
While voluntary participation did not improve the situation by
itself, it produced a significant increase of cooperation when
coupled with positive incentives. This finding is consistent with
[34], who argued that a positive interplay between institutional
incentives and voluntary participation could exist. However, we
could not support their hypothesis on the superiority of negative
over positive incentives. Note that this difference may be due to
the fact that, in order to simplify the game structure in a set of
understandable instructions, we introduced fixed incentives and
assumed that their magnitude did not depend on the number of
cooperators and defectors in the population.
It is worth noting that the significant cooperation level in Ex-Pos
was not due to intending defectors’ choosing not to participate in
the game. Indeed, these players had no rational incentive to
abstain from playing and actually chose to exit only in a few cases.
This could be explained in terms of a ‘frame effect’ [13]: combined
Figure 3. Treatment effects on participants’ profits. (a) Average final profit per treatment with standard error bars. (b) Total profit per
treatment as proportion of the optimum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.g003
Table 4. ANOVA table on participants’ final profits.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(wF)
exit 1 584.03 584.03 1.64 0.202
positive 1 47920.92 47920.92 134.75 0.000
negative 1 906.51 906.51 2.55 0.113
exit6positive 1 7452.17 7452.17 20.96 0.000
exit6negative 1 3444.01 3444.01 9.68 0.002
residuals 138 49075.03 355.62
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069871.t004
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with exit, not only did positive incentives induce subjects to expect
that only well-intentioned subjects would have participated, but,
more importantly, this induced subjects to attach higher expected
payoffs to cooperative strategies and predict more cooperation
from other subjects.
When considering the aggregate benefit of players, Ex-Pos had
the highest earnings, both in absolute terms and considering the
extra money provided by the institution itself. This result suggests
that institutions and organizations could improve their perfor-
mance by setting up positive incentives while giving individuals the
chance of voluntarily choosing whether to participate. Indeed, this
could have a frame effect coherent with the positive nature of the
incentive and induce individuals to expect more good behaviour
from others. This is what happens with voluntary participation of
individuals to civic or non-profit associations and organizations,
where a good mix of voluntarism and rewards (mostly symbolic)
tends to ensure high levels of cooperation that would be
unattainable only with rewards or punishment. This could also
help to reconsider the conventional approach to public policy,
which is presently restricted only to incentives.
To sum up, although weakly significant in itself, voluntary
participation led to increased cooperation in commons dilemmas
when combined with institutional enforcement. Obviously, in the
case of real organizations and institutions, there is no perfect
monitoring and some free-riding behaviour may remain unpun-
ished. In this respect, an interesting extension of our work would
be to consider monitoring costs and/or asymmetry of information
such that subjects could, with a given probability, expect not to be
caught. This could lower the relatively good performance of
punishment, whereas the negative effect could be less considerable
for rewards. However, our results showed that in situations where
there is little room for good behaviour, even weak institutionally
built-in positive signals for social interaction (i.e., small rewards
and voluntary action) can modify the tragedy of the commons.
Materials and Methods
This section provides additional details on the experiment.
Ethics Statement
The experiment was held at the University of Brescia on April
23, 2012. Participants were students of the Faculty of Economics
recruited using the on-line system ORSEE [53]. All participants
were informed and gave their consent when they voluntarily
registered to ORSEE. Data collection fully complied with Italian
law on personal data protection (D.L. 30/6/2003, n. 196). Under
the applicable legal principles on healthy volunteers’ registries, the
study did not require ethical committee approval. Participants
played in sessions of 24 subjects and interacted anonymously
through a computer network running the experimental software z-
Tree [54].
Participant Instructions
The following is the English translation of instructions given to
the participants (original in Italian).
Introductory Periods
Screen 1: Overall information on the experiment
N All these instructions contain true information and are the
same for all participants.
N Please, read them very carefully. At the end, some questions
will be asked by the system to test your understanding of the
experiment.
N The experiment you are going to do concerns economic
problems.
N During the experiment, you will be asked to take decisions,
upon which your final earnings will depend. Earnings will be
paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
N Each decision will take place anonymously through your
computer screen.
N During the experiment, it is prohibited to talk with anyone. If
you do so, you will be excluded from the experiment and you
will lose your earnings. Please, turn your mobile phones off.
N For any information and question, put your hands up and wait
until an experimenter comes to your position.
N During the experiment, virtual monetary units (MU) are used
that have a fixed exchange rate with real Euro.
N For each MU earned in the experiment, you will receive 2
Euro cents.
N For example, if at the end of the experiment your earning is
600 MU, this means that you will receive 12.00 Euro (plus a
fixed show-up fee of 5 Euro).
Screen 2: Interaction Rules
N The experiment consists of a sequence of interaction rounds
between groups of 6 players.
N Groups are randomly matched and change each round;
therefore, they are made up of different individuals each
round.
N There is no way to know whom you are playing with, nor is it
possible to communicate with her/him.
N Each participant should make one decision each round.
N The experiment lasts 10 rounds.
Screen 3: Task Structure
N At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive an
endowment of 100 MU. This endowment may subsequently
increase or decrease depending on the results of the interaction
between your choice and those of the other players.
N In each round, you will have to choose whether to ‘help’ the
other members of the group.
N If you choose to help, you will bear a cost of 10 MU, while the
other five group members will receive an overall benefit of
20 MU (evenly divided among them).
N If you decide not to help, you will neither bear a cost, nor you
will give a benefit to the other group members.
N The choice is free and anonymous. At the end of each round,
the aggregate group result will be announced, but not the
identity of who decided to help or not.
N All group members must make a choice in each round.
N The benefits will be added to your endowment, while the cost
will be deducted from it. Your endowment will be accordingly
updated at the end of each round.
N The final endowment represents your earning, which will be
converted into Euro with the exchange indicated above (2
cents for each MU).
No Exit - No Incentives
Screen 1: Rules for the continuation of the experiment
N The experiment will now continue for 10 more rounds.
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N After these new 10 rounds the experiment will end.
N The MU earned in these new round will be added to your
previous earnings.
N The initial endowment for the new rounds is equal to the
previous one (100 MU).
N All the game rules remain the same.
Exit - No Incentives
Screen 1: Rules for the continuation of the experiment
N The experiment will now continue for 10 more rounds.
N After these new 10 rounds the experiment will end.
N The MU earned in these new round will be added to your
previous earnings.
N The initial endowment for the new rounds is equal to the
previous one (100 MU).
N In each of the new rounds, if you do not want to participate in
the game, you can do so by pressing the ‘do not participate’
button.
N In the rounds where you decide not to participate, you will
neither bear a cost nor give any benefits to the other group
members.
N If only one player chooses to participate, the game will not take
place and the next round will start.
N All other rules remain the same.
No Exit - Negative Incentives
Screen 1: Rules for the continuation of the experiment
N The experiment will now continue for 10 more rounds.
N After these new 10 rounds the experiment will end.
N The MU earned in these new round will be added to your
previous earnings.
N The initial endowment for the new rounds is equal to the
previous one (100 MU).
N In the new rounds, who decides not to help will be subjected to
a withdrawal of 5 MU to his/her endowment regardless of the
other players’ decision to help or not.
N All other rules remain the same.
Exit - Negative Incentives
Screen 1: Rules for the continuation of the experiment
N The experiment will now continue for 10 more rounds.
N After these new 10 rounds the experiment will end.
N The MU earned in these new round will be added to your
previous earnings.
N The initial endowment for the new rounds is equal to the
previous one (100 MU).
N In the new rounds, who decides not to help will be subjected to
a withdrawal of 5 MU from his/her endowment regardless of
the other players’ decision to help or not.
N In addition, in each of the new rounds, who does not want to
participate in the game can do so by pressing the `do not
participate’ button.
N In the rounds where you decide not to participate, you will
neither bear a cost nor give any benefits to the other group
members.
N If only one player chooses to participate, the game will not take
place and the next round will start.
N All other rules remain the same.
No Exit - Positive Incentives
Screen 1: Rules for the continuation of the experiment
N The experiment will now continue for 10 more rounds.
N After these new 10 rounds the experiment will end.
N The MU earned in these new round will be added to your
previous earnings.
N The initial endowment for the new rounds is equal to the
previous one (100 MU).
N In the new rounds, who decides to help will have a bonus of
5 MU, which will be added to his/her endowment regardless
of the other players’ decision to help or not.
N All other rules remain the same.
Exit - Positive Incentives
Screen 1: Rules for the continuation of the experiment
N The experiment will now continue for 10 more rounds.
N After these new 10 rounds the experiment will end.
N The MU earned in these new round will be added to your
previous earnings.
N The initial endowment for the new rounds is equal to the
previous one (100 MU).
N In the new rounds, who decides to help will have a bonus of
5 MU, which will be added to his/her endowment regardless
of the other players’ decision to help or not.
N In addition, in each of the new rounds, who does not want to
participate in the game can do so by pressing the ‘do not
participate’ button.
N In the rounds where you decide not to participate, you will
neither bear a cost nor give any benefits to the other group
members.
N If only one player chooses to participate, the game will not take
place and the next round will start.
N All other rules remain the same.
Dataset
This section briefly describes the variables included in the
dataset, which is separately provided as supporting information.
id: participant’s unique id number.
period: period number: periods 1–10 correspond to the
introductory game, periods 11–20 to the treatment.
intro: introductory game: 1 = true, 0 = false.
ex: exit allowed: 1 = true, 0 = false.
pos: positive incentive: 1 = true, 0 = false.
neg: negative incentive: 1 = true, 0 = false.
help: participant choice: 1 = helped, 0 = did not help, NA = did
not participate in the game.
exit: participation (exit) choice; 1 = participated in the game,
0 = did not participate in the game.
Supporting Information
Dataset S1 Supporting dataset.
(XLS)
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